Comment

Article 50 process will be cat’s cradle of complexity

by David Hannay | 30.08.2016
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How would the Article 50 process work if and when it is triggered? There are, of course, no precedents to go by as Article 50 has never before been used. A sensible way to proceed would be for the two parties (the UK and the Commission acting on behalf of the EU) to reach agreement on a list of all the EU laws, obligations, policies and administrative acts for which provision would need to be made in any withdrawal agreement.

That would not be a short list. Forty three years in which the parties have progressively integrated their economies more closely has left a large footprint. Having such an agreed list would preclude a lot of subsequent wrangling about what did and what did not need to be provided for in the withdrawal agreement. Whether such a common-sense approach will prevail, and be treated as a largely technical first stage, can only at this stage be guesswork.

One issue of considerable complexity that is sure to arise are the “acquired rights” of British citizens in other EU member states and those of their citizens here. It has always been clear that, both legally and in terms of natural justice, those rights would have to be protected. That makes it all the more surprising that the government has made such extraordinarily heavy weather in its first efforts to address the matter, and has only succeeded in spreading alarm and confusion amongst the millions of citizens so affected. It was neither wise nor humane to suggest that those rights might be a subject of negotiation.

And then questions will arise over the international obligations which the EU has entered into on behalf of all 28 of its member states, that is to say including the UK. So far as trade agreements are concerned these will cease to apply to the UK when it leaves the EU and the UK will have to negotiate new  agreements. But other binding agreements are less straightforward. Take, for example, the content of last December’s Paris conference on climate change in which the EU, including the UK, accepted limitations on its carbon emissions. How will those commitments be handled both by the EU (without the UK) and by the UK (outside the EU)?

No doubt the arguments over budgetary and other financial liabilities will be lengthy and contentious. They will be complicated by the fact that many of the programmes supported by the EU budget, for example those for scientific research and for regional development, take the form of multi-annual commitments for periods which may well extend beyond the date of withdrawal. We are talking here about zero-sum negotiations – what one side gains the other loses – always the most difficult sort to conclude amicably.       

So, before the tabloid press immerses itself in the delights of speculation about Britain’s share of the Commission’s art collection or of its wine cellar and of our continuing liabilities for the pensions of former Commissioners and MEPs, it might make more sense to concentrate on the more substantial and more serious aspects of what will necessarily be a fiendishly complex negotiation. And, note, this is before we plunge into the even more tangled issue of our future trading relationship with the EU.

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Edited by Hugo Dixon

Tags: Categories: Post-Brexit