David Hannay is a member of the House of Lords and former UK ambassador to the EU and UN.
Theresa May’s bid for another short extension of the Article 50 deadline – until 30 June – should not really surprise anybody. No doubt its principal appeal to its author is that it merely repeats what she asked for last time and thus does not break new and dangerous ground in party terms. It is par for the course from a Prime Minister whose policy making invariably runs on tramlines and who seems to find repetition a virtue. But it does not have anything else to commend it.
From the UK’s own point of view it provides too little time for the thorough re-shaping of our approach to the new relationship with the EU which is so urgently required. It then needs, in due course, to be reflected in a new version of the Political Declaration negotiated with the EU 27, before Parliament should be asked to approve it, as it is required to do by law, in a meaningful vote. It also provides too little time to consult the electorate which is so essential now that the outcome will be so far removed from what was promised by the Brexiters in 2016 (which no doubt makes it attractive to those who oppose such a confirmatory referendum).
From the point of view of the EU 27, 30 June is not only something they have already rejected. It raises the nightmare of an unending series of cliff edge crises; and the absorption of successive meetings of the European Council in Brexit business to the exclusion of everything else, including pressing issues over Eurozone governance, migration, the next budget framework and the appointment of a new leadership team for the EU’s institutions.
It is these other, entirely legitimate preoccupations which seem to be weighing on the minds of those among the EU 27 who hesitate over a longer extension. So far as the day to day running of the EU is concerned, a longer extension should raise no fears. After all it closely replicates for short term budgetary and trade matters what is already provided for in the transitional arrangements contained in the Withdrawal Treaty. So are those concerns well founded? With someone like Jacob Rees Mogg urging the government, which he still goes through the motions of supporting, to be as awkward as possible as long as we remain a member, the EU 27 could be forgiven for being concerned.
But, if you look at these non-Brexit issues one by one, there does not seem to be much justified cause for concern. On appointments to the key EU institutions it was already demonstrated the last time round, when David Cameron’s attempt to block Jean-Claude Juncker’s appointment as President of the Commission failed, that no single member state has a veto. On migration, the UK has as much interest as other member states in the EU’s external border controls being made more effective and in illegal economic immigration from the Middle East and Africa being discouraged.
As to the new Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) for the next seven year period beyond 2020, it is realistically unlikely that the key decisions will be taken until well into 2020, probably after the end of any new Article 50 extension. And how likely is it that a UK, about to embark on a very tricky post Brexit negotiation with the EU 27, will infuriate its future negotiating partners by attempting to veto a new MFF? Far more likely it will share the views of many other member states in wanting to increase spending on research and innovation and on external policies designed to protect and promote European interests and values in a troubled world. What to worry about there?